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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utalt 
AMY ELIZABETH McKEE 
OSTLER GREENER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS IDCHARDSON GREENER 
and JAMES AFTEN GREENER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 7265 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
XIII 
THrE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECREE 
AND SET APART AS THE SOLE AND SEPARATE 
PROPERTY OF THE PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF OF THE 
TOTAL FUND OF $19,879.31 WHICH WAS ON DEPOS-
IT IN THE JOINT ACCOUNTS OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND GREENER ON AND PRIOR TO DECEMBER 22, 
1947. 
Respondents take the position in their brief "that this is 
a divorce case, and that the matters with respect to the 
moneys on deposit in various banks involved in this litiga-
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tion is merely incidental to the main issue of divorce, and 
that if this Court sustains the decree of the trial court no 
further orders or decrees with respect to the money in-
volved herein are necessary or proper, except that the same 
be released to the defendants. It was upon this theory that 
the case was tried to the court below . " 
(Br. 9-10). 
Of course, it goes without sayi11g that if this Court 
sustains the decree of the lower court this case is ended in 
all respects. We do not believe, however, that the above 
statement sets forth what counsel had in mind. We be-
lieve that what, in effect, they intended to say was that if 
this. Court upheld the lower court in denying the plaintiff 
a divorce, no further orders or decrees with respect to the 
money involved could be made because the money ques-
tion was merely incidental to the main issue of divorce and 
consequently fails with the divorce. If this be counsels' 
contention, then counsel are in error. 
In the first place, counsel know full well that it was 
plaintiff's contention in the lower court that regardless of 
whether a divorce was granted, plaintiff was entitled to 
recover her one-half share of the joint accounts, and what-
ever ·part of the balance to which she may be entitled by 
reason of her marital rights. It has always been - and 
now is- plaintiff's contention that Greener had no right, 
under any circumstances, to give away the plaintiff's share 
of the joint funds and that having done so plaintiff may 
follow such funds and recover them. In re Sutter, 245 N. 
Y. S. 636; O'Connor v. Dunnigan, 143 N.Y. S. 373 (affirmed 
without opinion, 213 N. Y. 676, 107 N. E. 1082); in re Klenk, 
150 N. Y. S. 365 (affirmed without opinion, 214 N. Y. 715, 
108 N. E. 1098). 
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In the Suttcer case the court distinguishes between cases 
where the cotenant's act amounts merely to a severance 
and cases where he wrongfully withdraws or. appropriates 
more than half of the estate, saying: 
"Some cotenancy, however, remains even after 
such severance; and in this lies the difference between 
a case of severance and one of destruction in which one 
cotenant alone attempts to destroy every vestige of the 
joint tenancy and also any further cotenancy whatso-
ever, by appropriating to himself alone not only his 
own moiety, but also that of his cotenant as well. Such 
attempt at utter destruction of all cotenancy in the 
premises, being wholly unwarranted and ineffectual as 
such, the rights of the cotenants are deemed to remain 
as they were before such destructive attempt had been 
made.'' 
In O'Connor v. Dunnigan, supra, where money was de-
posited in a bank in an account which read, "Payable to 
[wife or husband]. Pay to either or the survivor of either" 
the court held that the form of deposit indicated an intent 
to create a joint ownership with the right of survivorship; 
that it was immaterial whether the mof!ey originally came 
from the husband or from the wife; and that while as be-
tween the bank and the wife, she had the right to withdraw 
the money from the account, her withdrawal of the same 
and placing it in an account in her individual name, in the 
absence of, and so far as appeared, without the consent of 
the husband, could not divest him of his joint ownership in 
the property. The court said: 
"It would be preposterous to claim that an ap-
propriation of personal property by one joint owner 
to his personal use could divest th~ interest of the other 
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joint owner, or could in any waj' be presumed to have 
been by the consent of his co-owner." 
See also State v. Gralewski's Estate (Ore.) 159 P. 2d 
211, where this question is discussed at length and cases 
collected. 
In our main brief we have shown that a joint tenancy 
existed between plantiff and defendant in respect of the 
funds on deposit in their joint names. If this be true, under 
the provisions of Sec. 40-2-6 of the Utah Code Annotated 
plaintiff can maintain suit against Greener for any right 
growing out of the tenancy in the same manner and to the 
same extent as if they were unmarried. With the funds 
havingj been transferred by Greener to Aften, a suit in 
equity by the plaintiff would lie against them to set aside 
the conveyance and recover her share whether she also 
sued for a divorce or not. Equity acts to prevent a multi-
plicity of suits and when once jurisdiction is obtained of a 
controversy on any ground and for any purpose, it will 
retain jurisdiction for the purpose of administering com-
plete relief. Parascandolo v. Christensen (Nev.) 199 P. 2d 
629. 
While the pleadings of the plaintiff may be somewhat 
inartistically drawn, they do show that plaintiff claims an 
interest in the joint accounts and prays inter alia. that the 
transfer of the funds from the joint accounts to Aften be 
set aside to the extent of any and all interest of the plain-
tiff; that she be declared the absolute owner of one-half of 
the funds and of such further sums to which she may be 
entitled by reason of her marital rights. She also prays 
for general relief ( R, 41-42) . 
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Respondents' counsel, throughout these proceedings 
have, we admit, argued that whatever relief might be awar-
ded the plaintiff was dependent upon a divorce being gran-
ted her. But to say that this was the theory upon which 
the case was tried below is inaccurate and untrue, as the 
pleadings show. 
We, therefore, submit that under the law and the evi-
dence the plaintiff is entitled to recover her moiety in the 
funds that were in the joint account regardless of whether 
or not she is entitled to a divorce, and that she is also en-
titled to have the remaining part of said funds subjected 
to her right of support and other marital rights, including 
her right of survivorship. 
XIV 
RESPONDENTS ARE BOUND ON APPEAL BY THE 
THEORY OF- THE CASE ADOPTED BY THEM IN THE 
LOWER COURT. 
This Court has held many times that the theory of a 
case assumed and acted upon by the parties in the lower 
court must be adhered to on appeal. Aaron v. Holmes, 35 
U. 49, 99 P. 450; Holman v. Christensen, 73 U. 389, 274 P. 
457; Schuyler v. Southern Pacific Co., 37 U. 612, 109 P. 
1025. 
We invite the Court's attention to the joint answer of 
the respondents and the cross complaint of the respondent 
Greener. In the answer it is admitted that Greener trans-
ferred certain sums on deposit in various banks to Aften 
(R, 106). No prayer for relief is made by Aften, but Green-
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er prays that the complaint be dismissed and that he, as 
cross complainant, be awarded a decree of divorce. As 
cross complainant, he also prays for general relief (R, 108). 
On the hearings on order to show cause, both Greener 
and Aften testified that the sums on deposit in the joint 
accounts previously mentioned were given by Greener to 
Aften as an outright gift (Tr. 196-197, 204-205, 210, 214-
215). At the trial on the merits Greener likewise so tes-
tified (Tr. 124, 128). 
By what right, or under what theory, then, can re-
spondents' present contention that Aften holds the money 
in trust for Greener be sustained? The pleadings in this 
case, even if examined microscopically, will fail to show 
in the slightest degree any allegation to support such a re-
sult. 
We sincerely submit that under the decisions of this 
Court, Aften is not before the Court on this appeal, and 
Greener is before the Court only on the question as to 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce. Neither re-
spondent, having testified below and taken the position that 
outright gifts were made by Greener to Aften of the sums 
involved, can now be heard to say that there was no gift, 
and by such statement benefit Greener, to the detriment 
of the plaintiff. 
Respondents urge, apparently in their attempt to sup-
port the decision of the lower court, "that, in case general 
relief only is asked, any relief that is supported by the 
pleadings and the evidence may be granted, is well settled" 
(Br. 34). Of course, we have no quarrel with this statement, 
but we submit that it is of no benefit to the respondents, for, 
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as we have pointed out, neither the pleadings nor the evi-
dence supports the imposition of a trust in favor of Green-
er. In this regard, it is significant that respondents have 
cited no authority that will support such result. 
There are many statements in Respondents' Brief that 
do not square with the testimony in this case. Some of 
them will readily be identified by the Court, but we desire 
to call attention to the following wholly-fallacious argu-
ments: 
( 1) Counsel for respondents state that "Greener at 
all times had exclusive control over the funds," 
that "at no time prio.r to the separation of the 
parties in January, 1948, did the plaintiff make 
any claim to said funds," and that plaintiff treat-
ed the funds "at all times as the sole property 
of Greener" (Br. 24, 25). 
On direct examination, Greener testified that he 
couldn't eat or sleep, and that when he slept with plaintiff 
he "laid all night wondering how in the devil I was going 
to get out of that net she had me in" (Tr. 119). Later, 
on cross examination, he described the "net" as being plain-
tiff's joint ownership with him of the funds, and testified 
that he waited until plaintiff was in California to close out 
the joint accounts because he "couldn't get away fron1 her 
to do it," "didn't want her there when I did it," and "didn't 
want her to know that I done it" (Tr. 139). 
If it be true that plaintiff had no control over the funds, 
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made no claim thereto, and treated the same as being 
Greener's exclusive property, why was he so concerned 
about the status of the joint accounts that he couldn't sleep? 
Why was it necessary for him to delay closing said accounts 
until he could do so without plaintiff's knowledge or inter-
ference? In the light of Greener's own testimony, there 
is only one reasonable answer to those questions: He knew 
that plaintiff was aware of her interest in those funds and-
even though she was honest and made no attempt to take 
them into her sole possession as she might have done, and 
as he did-he also knew that she was determined to pre-
serve the funds. He had given her to understand very defi-
nitely that she had an interest in them, at the very least 
to the extent that they would be used "to keep her for the 
rest of her days" (Tr. 6) and to assure her that "she would 
never have to go on the old age pension" (Tr. 6, 102, 103, 
106). 
There is undisputed testimony that one of Greener's 
sons had vowed that he would see to it that plaintiff "didn't 
get a penny" of the money (Tr. 22). If it be true, as re-
spondents' counsel have urged, that plaintiff had no con-
trol over and made no claim to the funds, but treated them 
as belonging exclusively to Greener, there would have been 
no reason for his son to be disturbed about the disposition 
of the money. 
As further evidence of plaintiff's interest in and claim 
to the funds, we quote the following from Greener's testi-
mony on cross examination (Tr. 134): 
"When I moved those deposit books from one place 
to another, she [plaintiff] was right on the job, she 
was watching them books mighty close and she didn't 
allow anything done with them." 
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If the parties understood that the funds belonged ex-
clusively to Greener, why did plaintiff watch the books 
"mighty close" and prevent anything being done with them? 
The reasonable explanation of her interest is that she knew, 
from the promises her husband had made, that she was a 
present joint owner of the funds and that they did not be-
long exclusively to him. Hie also had the same understand-
ing. 
If, as is claimed, Greener placed plaintiff's name on the 
accounts solely for the purpose of avoiding probate (Br. 28), 
he should have had no problems. His alleged "exclusive 
control over the funds," coupled with the asserted circum-
stance that plaintiff made no claim_ to said funds and 
treated them at all times "as the sole property of Greener," 
should have relieved him of any feeling that he was caught 
in a "net." He should have felt free to take the deposit 
books to the banks, withdraw the funds, and deposit them 
to his own account. He didn't do those things because he 
did not have the exclusive control over the funds and he 
knew that plaintit.l had a present interest in them. 
Here is a man who, in the words of his own counsel, 
"during some 35 years through rigid economy 
and scrupulous savings" (Br. 4) had accumulated a home, 
some War Bonds and the funds with which we are now 
concerned. If we are to believe his testimony, Greener 
has taken from the banks and other institutions those hard-
earned funds over which he claims he had exclusive con-
trol and concerning which he asserts plaintiff had made no 
claim, and given it all way, with the exception of "a few 
coppers in my purse" (Tr. 126). 
Are those the acts of a man who has sole and exclusive 
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control over and right to property? We submit that they 
are not! 
The Court's attention is respectfully called to the sev-
eral statements in Greener's testimony to the effect that 
he intended that all of his property would go to plaintiff 
upon his death (Tr. 122, 130, 141), and that it was his in-
tention that plaintiff should have some of the money as 
her own during her lifetime (Tr. 158-9). 
( 2) Respondents' counsel consider it significant that 
plaintiff did not draw on the funds for her own 
needs and to repay Greener the $2,000 received 
by her at the time of the first divorce. 
The court below has taken the position that, if plain-
tiff had known that the accounts were hers as much as 
Greener's, she would have used them for her own purposes; 
also, that instead of quarreling and bickering over the 
$2,000 settlement in the first divorce, she would have re-
paid Greener that amount by drawing a check on one of 
the joint accounts. 
In their brief, respondents' counsel have adopted the 
trial court's view and developed the theory that plaintiff's 
failure to withdraw all or part of the money and use the 
same for her own purposes constituted evidence that she 
claimed no interest in the funds. They state that Greener 
made and signed all checks and withdrawals from the ac-
counts; that "although the passbooks were kept in the home 
of plaintiff and Greener, plaintiff at no time made any at-
tempt to take them into her possession" (Br. 25) ; and "that, 
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although plaintiff had access to the passbooks, she "made 
no attempt to withdraw any funds from these accounts, 
but relied wholly upon what he was willing to give her" 
(Br. 28). And then counsel reach the conclusion that those 
facts constitute "clear and convincing proof sufficient to 
overcome any presumption that might arise from placing 
the plaintiff's name on the joint tenancy cards" (Br. 28). 
We submit that it is not unusual for honorable joint 
owners to have an interest in funds without threatening 
to remove or actually removing them from the joint con-
trol. Our research on the. subject has disclosed no reported 
case which would be authority for the proposition that the 
test of ownership of joint accounts is "who got to the bank 
first and withdrew the most." We are confident that this 
Court will not be impressed by respondents' theory, but 
will apply other and better-considered rules in determining 
the question of ownership. If respondents' argument is 
followed, it would be necessary for a joint owner to be fleet 
of foot and immune to pangs of conscience in order to pre-
serve his interest in property. 
In connection with the return of the $2,000 paid plain-
tiff at the time of the first divorce, Greener's counsel argue· 
that "had the parties considered the plaintiff as having any 
present interest in said funds, it would have been quite un-
necessary to quarrel about the return of any amount" (Br. 
28-9). On the contrary, it appears to us that plaintiff's 
present interest in the funds was the very reason for the 
quarrels referred to. If she had no such interest, she might 
have felt obligated to return the money. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit that the decision of the low-
er court should be reversed and judgment rendered in favor 
of the appellant as set forth in her pleadings and in her 
main brief herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. E. BLACKHAM, 
CLYDE D. SANDGREN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Received..._ __ _ copies of the foregoing Reply Brief 
of Appellant, this , ____ day of February, A. D. 1949. 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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